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Problems relatingto the legal standardof care to be imposed upon
members of the medical profession have aroused increasing interest in recent years. Particularly difficult to define is the legal
obligation on the part of the doctor growing out of the intimate
relationshipbetween a psychiatristand his patient. In this article
the author critically analyzes the rather sparse case law dealing
with this variation of the physician-patientrelation and sets down
numerous guidelines in this still-developing area of the law.

0

NE OF THE most widespread afflictions to health today is
mental illness,' and the use of psychotherapy to treat certain
forms of this illness has made psychiatry a significant and growing
field of medicine. Despite the increased reliance on psychiatry,
however, no American appellate case has been found involving a
cause of action for malpractice in the use of psychotherapy. 2 This
fact may be attributable in part to the skill of psychiatrists in
handling the negative feelings of patients or to the natural reluctance
of patients to open their psychiatric history to public scrutiny. The
absence of any successful malpractice action may also be due to the
lack of a firm doctrinal footing for such an action.
The little existing case law has often dealt with aspects of psychiatric practice where the risks are a predictable element of which
the patient may be apprised before treatment,3 or has concerned the
propriety of involuntary hospitalization with the most limited of
SBA. 1957, Harvard University; LL.B. 1962, Yale University. Member, New
York
1 and District of Columbia Bars.
See Osmundsen, New Unit Formed on Schizophrenia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1965, p. 28, col. 7. "It has been estimated that one in every four hospital beds in
this country is occupied by a schizophrenic." Ibid. Cf. Jaffe, Public Gives View on
Mental Health, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1965, p. 153, col. 1.
2 See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 619-20 (1965). See generally Bellamy, Malpractice
Risks Confronting the Psychiatrist: A Nationwide Fifteen-Year Study of Appellate
Court Cases, 1946 to 1961, 118 AimICAN J. PSYCmATRY 769 (1962). One case, Hammer
v. Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165
N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960), may represent a sole exception. See note 37 infra.
OFor example, the occurrence of fracture in the use of shock therapy is not un-

common. See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
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doctor-patient relationships having been established. 4 Because it

may be expected that the number of cases coming before the courts
will increase in the future, some aspects of malpractice as they

concern the psychiatrist and his patient, with special emphasis
5
upon the psychotherapeutic relationship, will be suggested.
The psychiatrist and his patient
The psychiatrist and his patient meet under a variety of circum-

stances. An adult encountering marital difficulties, experiencing
protracted headaches, or having difficulty solving a family or business crisis consults a psychiatrist on his own motion. A twelve-year-

old child with an intelligence quotient of one hundred and twentyfive cannot do sixth grade work and is referred by the school prin-

cipal to a psychiatrist. An adolescent girl "meets" a psychiatrist on
a ward of a general hospital after a quarrel with her boyfriend has
led her to slash her wrists. The mother of three children awakens
from weeks of psychotic withdrawal to her first recognition of the
physician who has been treating her throughout that time.
The diagnosis of a psychiatrist may range from process schizophrenia to the most transient of neurotic symptoms. Treatment can

be the prescription of tranquilizing drugs after a meeting on the
ward of a hospital, or it can involve psychotherapeutic sessions

several times a week for a number of years." Each constitutes a
relationship where the psychiatrist is functioning as a physician
treating a patient,7 and each can form the basis of an action for
malpractice.
Central to psychotherapeutic treatment is the establishment of
"See, e.g., Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 235, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1954);
Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 289, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338, 341 (Sup. Ct. 1888). See also note
20 infra and accompanying text.
Cases involving a psychotherapeutic situation include Hammer v. Rosen, 7 App.
Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198
N.Y.S.2d 65 (19603; Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in The Times (London),
March 8, 1961, p. 5, col. , aff'd (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov.
23, 1961, p. 5, col. 1. Cf. Bellandi v. Park Sanitarium Ass'n, 214 Cal. 472, 6 P.2d 508
(1931); Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. 9- C.2d 635, 35 North. Co. R. 206 (C.P.
Northampton County Ct. 1959).
' See, e.g., Hammer v. Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 217, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (1959)
(dissenting opinion), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960),
where psychotherapeutic treatment continued for over seven years. See also Barten,
"The 15-minute Hour". Brief Therapy in a Military Setting, 122 AmmEcAN J. PsycaTRy 565 (1965).
7
See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEmP.

L.Q. 401, 404-05 (1957).
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a relationship with the psychiatrist to which the patient can bring
past experiences and emotions, and in which he can establish the
model for a new method of dealing with his environment.8 Through
the establishment of a transference with the psychiatrist, 9 the patient reacts towards him with the emotional responses he had learned
and used with his parents and siblings, thus experiencing again the
emotions of the past. Through such a reliving, and the interpretation of the experience, the patient learns to understand his reactive patterns and through them to grow to new and more mature
behavior. The center of the growth is often an identification with
the therapist, where the patient sees in the therapist the image of the
healthy person, and comes to make healthy patterns of response his
own.' 0
Shock therapy cases
Electro and insulin shock therapy are ways of building up the
patient's "defenses and controls and self-confidence" in the case
of the former, and of relieving "basic anxiety" and "disturbance
of the mood" in the case of the latter."' They accomplish with a
jolt what the psychotherapies achieve through directed conversation.
The cases, for the most part, seek damages for fractures resulting
from the negligent application of the therapies. 12 Fracture is a
8

See Burnham, Separation Anxiety, 13 ARcHIVEs GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 346 (1965).
"The therapist's own behavior also constitutes an important model for the patient
who will introject qualities of solid reliability as he perceives them in the doctor...
The model function of the therapist who demonstrates how he handles conflicts,
uncertainties, and troublesome affects has been emphasized by various authors including Hoedemaker and Szasz." Id. at 357.
See Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. & C2d 635, 639, 35 North. Co. R. 206, 209
(C.P. Northampton County Ct. 1959); Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in
The Times (London), March 8, 1961, p. 5, col. 3, aff'd (C.A. Nov. 22, 1961) in The
Times (London), Nov. 23, 1961, p. 5, col. 1; Heller, supra note 7, at 406.
10 See Burnham, supra note 8, at 357.
t' Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo. 1960). See Mitchell v. Robinson,
360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962). See also Horwitz, Insulin Shock Therapy in 2 AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

1485 (Arieti ed. 1959) where the author observes that shock

therapy has been "considered the most accepted somatic treatment for schizophrenia,"
ibid., and has been employed in treating paranoia, id. at 1496, but has decreased in
use because of the dangers involved and because of the advent of tranquilizing drugs,
id. at 1485-86.
Shock therapy may also be used as a means of combatting depression. See Kalinowsky, Convulsive Shock Treatment in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1499, 1510
(Arieti ed. 1959).
12
See, e.g., Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Mitchell v. Robinson,
360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962) (failure to warn of hazards); Bolan v. Friern Hosp. Comm.,
[1957] 2 All E. R. 118 (Q.B.).

Vol. 1966: 696]

MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS

699

known incident of electro and insulin shock therapy. Either through
passage of an electric current through the brain, or through the
injection of insulin, a convulsion occurs which causes fractures in a
modest but measurable percentage of the cases. 13 The risks of
physical injury incident to shock therapy exist without regard to
the degree of care exercised by the physician or those to whom its
administration has been delegated. 14 The threat of fracture, however, would appear to be compensated for by the possibility of
the remedial effects, and it is not surprising that the courts have
15
refused to hold doctors absolutely liable.
So long as the patient is fully informed beforehand of the injurious side effects, it may be convincingly argued that he has consented to the risks involved. To assure the maximum efficacy of
this defense, the doctor should explain the dangers to the patient or to someone acting in his behalf and procure a signed
consent form in which the hazards are simply and clearly set
forth. 1 Aside from those instances involving the negligent administration of the therapy, what victories plaintiffs have achieved have
been in cases where these procedures were not followed, and the
23 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 524 P.2d 520 (1953). Quoting the "undisputed testimony" of a medical expert, the court observed: "[T]he overall incidence
of fractures in shock treatment varies anywhere from perhaps one-half to about
three and a half per cent. If one considers fractures of the spine . . . the incidence
is between 10 and 40 per cent." Id. at 511, 254 P.2d at 525. See also Mitchell v.
Robinson, 834 S.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Mo. 1960) (mentioning expert testimony of fractures
in 18, 19, and 25 per cent of the cases involved in three studies); Stone v. Proctor,
259 N.C. 633, 637, 131 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1963) (fractures in 15 to 30 per cent of the
cases); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 439, 192 S.W.2d 992, 997 (1946).
Another injurious side effect of shock therapy may be mental confusion or
memory impairment. See Zamora and Kaelbling, Memory and Electroconvulsive
Therapy, 122 AMERICAN J. PSYCHIATRY 546, 552-53 (1965).
"4E.g., Farber v. Olkon, supra note 13, at 511, 254 P.2d at 524-25; Quinley v.
Cocke, supra note 13, at 439, 192 S.W.2d at 997.
15 In Quinley v. Cooke, the court observed that if liability were to be found upon
mere proof of the injury, "the physician and surgeon would always be in fear of the
result of a scientific treatment knowing that he might have to defend his professional
reputation in open court." 183 Tenn. at 440, 192 S.W.2d at 997. Cf. Ewing v. Goode,
78 Fed. 442, 443 (C.CS.D. Ohio 1897) (Taft, J.). See generally LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISAnLE AND THE LA. 149-50 (1961); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv.
333 (1963).
26 See Lester v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1957); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N. Mex. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1962); SHARTEL & PLANT, THm
LAw OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 12-13 (1959); Kelly, The Physician, the Patient, & the
Consent, 8 KAN. L. REV. 405, 424-26 (1960).
For an example of such a form suggested by two physicians, one of whom had
been sued for malpractice, see Rodis & Groh, One Aspect of the Medicolegal Implications of Shock Theory, 51 SOUTHERN MEDICAL J. 219, 220 (1958).
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physicians either failed to explain the risks fully,17 or did not allow
the patient the choice of taking or declining the therapy.18
Because the immunity afforded by a valid consent form extends
only to the inherent risks of careful treatment, the patient may succeed if he can prove that the injury was caused by actual negligence
and did not result from the assumed risks. Confronted with signed
consent forms, patients have sometimes contended that the existence of fracture, and nothing more, denotes such negligence. This
application of res ipsa loquitur has been uniformly denied. 19
The wrongful commitment cases
Attempts by patients to hold psychiatrists liable in damages for
wrongful commitment to mental hospitals have been hampered by
conceptual difficulties. Despite mistakes in diagnosis, the cases
have found no duty of care on the part of the examining and certifying psychiatrists; thus they stop short of the first barrier in the
course of a malpractice action.20 Since the question involved is
neither the nature of the treatment given nor the mode of therapy
recommended, but instead simply whether treatment at a hospital
should be compelled, the commitment cases contribute very little
to an understanding of the legal limits of psychiatric practice.
Toward a usable concept of psychotherapeuticmalpractice:
duty of care and skill
The liability of the psychiatrist to his patient is for the breach
of a duty to the patient to bring to their relationship the skill and
1

7E.g., Mitchell v. Robinson, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962); Woods v. Brumlop,
71 N.
Mex. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
"8 Johnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
2 E.g., Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 347 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other

grounds, 251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 510, 254 P.2d
520, 525 (1953); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 440-41, 192 S.W.2d 992, 996-97 (1946).
'0 The conceptual difficulties encountered by one who attempti to bring an action
against a certifying physician for wrongful commitment are inherent in the statutes
which provide for precommitment examinations by doctors. The courts generally
conclude that the psychiatrist is acting as a court witness and because the examination is statutorily commanded, the doctor-patient relationship does not arise. Conse.
quently there is a complete immunity. E.g., Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860 (7th
Cir. 1959); Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954); Dunbar v.
Greenlaw, 152 Me. 270, 128 A.2d 218 (1956); Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d
722 (1951). Contra, Kleber v. Stevens, 39 Misc. 2d 712, 241 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct.
1963), aff'd 20 App. Div. 2d 896, 249 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1964); Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun.
282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
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the care of a professionally qualified psychiatrist practicing in that
community. 21 There need be no express undertaking on the part
of the psychiatrist that he will so conduct himself, for it is his pro-

fession itself which implies the attributes of his practice. 22 The
concept of skill is one of technical proficiency: knowledge of and the
ability to apply the medically appropriate therapy. Care, on the
other hand, imports a mode of execution, the guidance which the
will gives to skill.
Courts sometimes characterize the quantum of care required as
"ordinary," "extraordinary," "the highest degree," or by some other
such conceptual quantification. z The measure of care which the
law exacts in a particular case may depend on various factors incident to the treatment. One court has made it a function of the
mystery of the illness. 24 Another has made it depend upon the gravity
of the consequences of error.25 It may also be a function of the
2- Johnston v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345, 346 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other grounds,
251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (shock therapy). Accord, Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d
503, 511, 254 P.2d 520, 525 (1953) (shock therapy); Ayers v. Russell, supra note 20,
at 389, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341 (wrongful commitment); Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7.
1961) in The Times (London), March 8, 1961, p. 5, col. 3, aff'd (CA. Nov. 22, 1961)
in The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1961, p. 5, col. 1 (psychotherapy). See McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. Ray. 549, 559 (1959). See
generally PRossER, TORTS § 32, at,164-68 (3d ed. 1964).
' 2 Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun. 282, 289, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338, 341 (Sup. Ct. 1888). Accord,
Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953) (surgeon); Riggs v. Christie,
342 Mass. 402, 405-06, 173 N.E.2d 610, 613 (1961) (general practitioner); Kennedy v.
Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 360, 90 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1956) (surgeon). See also 2 KENT, ComAMENTARIES *572. "So, if a surgeon should undertake gratis to attend a wounded person, and should treat him improperly, he would be liable -for improper treatment,
because his profession implied skill in surgery." Ibid.; Cline, Professional Liability,
35 NEB. L. REv. 547 (1956).
The duty of cafe may also arise when the physician, without agreement, actually
undertakes to care for the plaintiff. See McCoid, supra note 21, at 555.
23 E.g., Ayers v. Russell, supra note 22, at 289, 3 N.Y. Supp. at 341 (ordinary care);
McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 268 (1863) (reasonable diligence); Wood v. Clapp,
36 Tenn. 26, 28 (1856) ("reasonable" degree of skill and science as opposed to
"highest" degree); Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in The Times (London),
March 8, 1961, p. 5, col. 3, aff'd (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23,
1961, p. 5, col. 1 ("very greatest care').
2' Landau v. Werner, supra note 23. "A psychiatrist had explosive forces under his
control and if they were released the consequences might be disastrous. He must
exercise the very greatest care in dealing with the dark secrets of the human mind."
Ibid. Compare Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149, 21 Ad. 525 (1891) (per curiam).
"The most the case discloses is an error of judgment, to which the most careful and
skillful physician is liable in a mysterious disease like insanity." Ibid. The increase
in severity in the period between Williams and Landau, arrived at while retaining the
rhetoric of magic, suggests that courts will require more care of psychiatrists as the
nature of the mystery of mental illness is revealed.
"'Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163 (1883). "Apart from any statutory require-
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tractability of the forces being controlled: their danger,2 the skill
necessary to control them2 7 or the interest at stake. 2

Such a scaling

of duty is analogous to the variations in the standards of care imposed upon bailees having different degrees of interest in the bailment.29
Beneath the words of "skill" and "care" may be a fiduciary
ment, the law would undoubtedly hold the defendants in such a case [erroneous
certificate of insanity] to the usual professional liability for due care and skill, and
when the seriotis consequences that may flow from reliance upon such a certificate
by the municipal officers [are considered], the imprisonment of a sane person in an
insane asylum, perhaps for a long time, the standard of care required and of professional learning and ability to deal with such a subject would certainly be an
exacting one." Id. at 168. Cf. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960).
26 Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in The Times (London), March 8,
1961, p. 5, col. 3, aff'd (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1961,
p. 5, col. 1. As the court put it, "if mistakes were made in psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, or other forms of psychological therapy which employed transference, the
consequences might be disastrous and indeed irrevocable." Ibid. A hint of the concept of dangerous instrumentality lurks behind the rule in-Landau as it does behind
the absoluteness of the liability in Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756,
198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). That the dangerous instrumentality rule rather than the
niceties 'of the law of assault will play a part in -the application of the Hammer
case is suggested by Sawyer v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 234 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374
(Sup. Ct. 1962). The concept of dangerous instrumentality contributes to many applications of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 374.
27 Cf. Connor v. Winton, 8 Ind. 315 (1856) (malpractice of a veterinary surgeon).
"The authorities are also abundant to show that, in proportion to the value of the
article to be kept, or the delicacy of the operation to be performed, will the act assume
character. What would be simply negligence as to one thing would be gross negligence
as to another." Id. at 319. Even though it is possible that the solution to the problem in Connor is whether the procedure was medically dictated by the veterinary
community, the court's use of the analogy of the bailment is interesting. The
similarity in derivation of standard of care and origin of duty in the law of bailment
with medical malpractice is especially apparent in a case which, by dealing with'
medical care of a chattel, stands in the gap between the law of bailment and that
of physician and patient. Cases often cross-fertilize the two bodies of law and see the
relationships in tandem.
It is suggested that the binding thread is the concept of trust arising out of a
degree of control of and responsibility for someone else, or something that belongs
to someone else. See note 29 infra and accompanying text. See also SCHOULER, BAILMENTS § 2 (1897).
,8Cf. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 268-69 (1853) (surgeon). "The principle
is contained in the pithy saying of Fitzherbert that 'it is the duty of every artificer
to exercise his skill rightly, and truly, as he ought.' This is peculiarly the duty of pro.
fessional practitioners, to whom the highest interests of man are often necessarily
intrusted." Id. at 269.
29 See, e.g., J. W. Mays, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 105, 107, 221 N.Y.S.2d
766, 768-69 (1961) (dicta) (liability only for gross negligence in gratuitous bailment);
Hobbie v. Ryan, 130 Misc. 221, 223 N.Y. Supp. 654 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (liability for even
slight negligence if bailment for bailee's benefit); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc.,
10 N.Y.2d 294 (1961) (dicta) (ordinary care required where bailment benefits bailor
and bailee). See generally SAINER, SuBsrANTIVE LAw OF NEw YoRK 29-34 (17th ed.
1964).
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matrix which governs the relationship of the psychiatrist to his patient. • ° For the legal trustee,
one of the most fundamental duties . .. is that he must display
throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the
interests of the cestui que trust, and must exclude all selfish interests ... 31
So likewise may we ask the psychiatrist to fulfill a fiduciary duty
to his patient.3 2 He should be expected to pursue the psychiatric
or emotional well-being of the patient rather than his own emotional demands or financial objectives when these interests are in
conflict.3 3 Then, as this fiduciary concept is applied to a given case,

the consequences of the task, the risks of failure, and the amount of
skill necessary to minimize the dangers will determine the demands
of the relationship.
Psychotherapy gives to the concept of trusteeship twin layers of
OSee note 28 supra.
11BOcERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 543, at 473-74 (2d ed. 1960); to the same effect is 2
Scorr TRUSTS § 170, at 1193 (2d ed. 1956). According to Blackstone, it was for a breach
of such trust that the action of malpractice would lie: "Injuries affecting a man's
health are where, by any unwholesome practices of another, a man sustains any
apparent damage in his vigour or constitution. As . . . by the neglect or unskilful
management of his physician, surgeon, or apothecary. For it hath beery solemnly
resolved that mala praxis is a great misdemeanor and offense at common law, whether
it be for curiosity and experiment, or by neglect; because it breaks the trust which
the party had placed in his physician, and tends to the patient's destruction." 3
BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES 122 (Sharswood ed. 1868).
Dotrinally, Blackstone saw
the action as arising for the breach of a contract implied in law. Ibid.
32The duty of disclosure has been bottomed upon the trust and confidence
marking the physician-patient relationship. See Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. App. 825,
163 S.E. 268, 269 (1932). It is within such a framework that we may understand
cases which depart from a strict rule requiring full disclosure to the patient of the
risks of treatment under all circumstances. See, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N. Mex.
211, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962); Bolam v. Frieru Hosp. Comm., [1957] 2 All E.R.
118 (Q.B.).
The cases of electroshock therapy which result in fracture where negligence is
alleged in failing to warn of the risks raise this issue nicely. They recognize the
duty of the psychiatrist to obtain consent to a physical invasion of the patient's
person as an operative procedure. The patient's interest in self-determination of the
physical disposition of his person is paramount. In these cases, however, the obligation of the physician involves the further duty to prefer the patient's interest in being
shielded from the incidents of shock and fear (leading him, in the difficult case, to
withdraw consent) which accompany his being told of the risks. The psychiatrist
may find it therapeutically necessary to subordinate his own interest in procuring
an "iron-clad" consent form. Therefore, some courts have liberalized the rule
necessitating disclosure when there is danger of unduly alarming the patient. See
Woods v. Brumlop, supra at 228, 377 P.2d at 525 (dictum); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242
N.C. 517, 523, 88 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1955).
"See note 28 supra.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1966: 696

meaning, for the essence of much psychotherapy is the contribution
of trust in the external world and ultimately in the self, modelled
upon the trusting relationship established during therapy.34 This
gives to the action of psychiatric malpractice a double sounding of
breach of trust, and casts the larger ambit of a psychotherapeutic
malpractice action in some detail.
The requirement of separation of interest which is demanded of
a legal trustee, however, encounters some special difficulty when imposed upon the psychiatrist. Specifically, there is professional medical opinion to the effect that, in the transference relationship, it is
34See, e.g., Heller, supra note 7.
"Patients will be helped only if they can
form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. Psychotherapy becomes otherwise
an ineffective and intellectual exercise. Problems in malpractice involve either a
breach of this relationship by the doctor or an unusually faulty approach to the
patient's problems." Id. at 406. "[The patient] is expected to bring up all manner
of socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse sexual thoughts
-in short, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed. To speak of such things
to another human requires an atmosphere of unusual trust, confidence and toler-

ance." Id. at 405.

See also Burnham, supra note 8. "A major goal, especially in the early stage of
psychotherapy, is to build a relationship in which the patient comes to trust the
doctor as a reliable object." Id. at 356. "The therapist's model function is salient
in his manner of handling major separation from the patient. In general, a matterof-fact calm trust in the patient's internal resources is helpful, in contrast to an attitude which conveys an uncomfortable, guilt-tinged, fearful concern that the patient may
be adversely affected by the separation." Id. at 357. See note 8 supra.
This then is the application of the therapeutic concept of trust to a specific
category of illness. As a characterization of the relationship of psychotherapist and
patient, and of the specific impartment of a therapy, the concept of trust shares
viability at different levels. But basic to all is the total concept of trust in human
development of which these are but the specific reflection.
See generally ERIKSON, I PSYCHOLOGICAL Issuas 50-63 (1959). "For the first
component of the healthy personality I nominate a sense of basic trust, which I think
is an attitude toward oneself and the world derived from the experiences of the
first year of life. By 'trust' I mean what is commonly implied in a reasonable trustfulness as far as others are concerned and a simple sense of trustworthiness as far as
oneself is concerned. When I say 'basic,' I mean that neither this component nor any
of those that follow are, either in childhood or in adulthood, especially conscious.
In fact, all of these criteria, when developed in childhood and when integrated in
adulthood, blend into the total personality. Their crisis in childhood, however, and
their impairment in adulthood are clearly circumscribed." Id. at 55-56. "What we
call 'trust' coincides with what Therese Benedek has called 'confidence.' If I prefer
the word 'trust,' it is because there is more naivete and more mutuality in it .
Id. at 61.
"At any rate, the psychiatrists, obstetricians, pediatricians, and anthropologists, to
whom I feel closest, today would agree that the firm establishment of enduring patterns for the balance of the basic trust over basic mistrust is the first task of the
budding personality and therefore first of all a task for maternal care ....
Mothers
create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of administration which in its
quality combines sensitive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of
personal trustworthiness within the trusted framework of their community's life
style." Id. at 63.
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not possible clearly to separate social and professional conduct.3 5
Yet, the few cases involving psychotherapy have vaguely defined a
perimeter both physical and emotional beyond which the psychiatrist is not privileged to travel. In Landau v. Wernere6 a psychiatrist embarked upon a series of social visits with a patient who
had "fallen in love" with him. In Hammer v. Rosen37 a psychiatrist
"5See Landau v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in The Times (London), March 8,
1961, p. 5, col. 3, aff'd (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1961,
p. 5, col. 1.
"Supra note 35. The plaintiff had been referred to the defendant, a psychiatrist,
in a highly nervous and emotional condition in March of 1949. He treated her by
"transference," in which past emotion is reactivated and attached to the psychiatrist,
causing the patient to feel towards him hopes, desires and fears of the past. By
May 28, 1949, after twenty-four consultations, plaintiff had become emotionally aroused
by the treatment, and sexually aroused by the intimate conversations with the
defendant. When she discussed with defendant her feelings towards him, and the
consequent shame and bafflement at their development, defendant advised her to
continue with the treatment, and told her that her feelings of love and bondage
would cease. Having reached the stage where plaintiff was very much in love with
defendant, but "so much better in health," the two came almost to the parting of the
ways. In August of 1949, however, thinking plaintiff not wholly cured, and fearing a
relapse to her previous anxiety state were she to be removed from his influence,
defendant decided not to end their association. He began instead a series of social
visits with plaintiff, all outside his consulting room where the treatment had so far
taken place. They rode in taxicabs together, visited restaurants, talked of a holiday
together and once visited plaintiff's bed sitting room. No improper advances on defendant's part, however, took place. Nevertheless, plaintiff failed fully to recover and,
as the probable result of the further visits, experienced a decline. After attempting
to terminate the relationship, defendant resumed the treatment in March of 1950,
about a year after it had first begun. The electro shock therapy which he instituted
did not change matters. In April of 1951 plaintiff attempted suicide. One of the
other physicians whom she later saw returned her to defendant for a final attempt
to resolve the transference, which effort failed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Queen's Bench verdict for plaintiff, holding
that unrefuted proof of medical condemnation of the introduction of social visits
into the course of treatment by a psychiatrist of a patient who is aroused towards
him by transference and which are the probable cause for a serious decline in condition from an improved level will justify a judgment in negligence.
377 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). Parents of plaintiff, a
diagnosed schizophrenic, solicited the care of defendant after plaintiff had undergone
extended psychiatric care including over one hundred fifty electric shock treatments.
Employing what was apparently a psychoanalytic therapy, defendant effected some
initial improvement in the patient's condition. His behavior, however, allegedly included bruising of the plaintiff with slaps and beatings. Defendant did not attempt
to show that the alleged assaults were part of the treatment, but rather, he denied
that they were inflicted.
Over the course of seven years of treatment, moreover, the initial improvement did
not prove of permanent duration, a phenomenon of "complex causation." The
Court of Appeals held inter alia that it was error for the trial court to have dismissed
a cause of action for malpractice, and it therefore modified the affirmance in the
Appellate Division. It held in substance that expert testimony to the fact of malpractice was unnecessary where "the very nature of the acts complained of bespeaks
malpractice" and therefore that the testimony of three witnesses to-alleged assaults
made out a prima facie case. 7 N.Y.2d at 880, 165 N.E.2d at 757, 198 N.YS.2d at 67.
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slapped and bruised his patient on several occasions in the course of
analytic treatment. Malpractice was established in each case.
Are we to infer from Landau v. Werner a prohibition against
any encounter between a psychiatrist and patient outside the psychiatrist's office? Does Hammer v. Rosen mean that a psychiatrist
is not privileged to put his arm around a female patient who is
crying at the end of her hour and kiss her forehead? Does a psychiatrist discuss with a patient his imminent vacation at his peril?
Neither of the cases necessarily forecloses such behavior. Landau
v. Werner finds no legitimate interest of the patient served by the
social visits. The interest of the girl was instead to have the relationship terminated. 38 Similarly if the clasp and the kiss are efforts
to comfort or otherwise treat the patient rather than the first steps
to seduction, Landau v. Werner would not appear to reach them.
Likewise Hammer v. Rosen, dealing as it does with violent physical
invasion, seemingly incorporates the law of assault and battery and
would reach neither the privileged touching which can be involved
in steadying or comforting hand-holding nor, perhaps-although the
court did not reach the question-in such slaps as may be professionally countenanced. Discussion of a therapist's imminent vacation and of his need to miss a therapeutic session may be an important method of alleviating his patient's anxiety,30 and as such,
would be permitted under Landau v. Werner. In a similar vein,
doctor and patient may, in fact, encounter each other socially under
circumstances where the worst thing a doctor could do, in therapeutic terms, might be to ignore or slight his patient. And planning a vacation at the same time as, or even at the same beach as
the therapist has chosen, may under certain circumstances constiSuch testimony likewise constituted sufficient proof of injury. The court stated that
damages in malpractice are for personal injuries including the pain and suffering
naturally flowing from the tortious act. Furthermore, a jury would be warranted
in finding that defendant's acts had caused the plaintiff pain and suffering. 7 N.Y.2d
at 380, 165 N.E.2d at 758, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
38See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
SoSee Burnham, supra note 8. "Sometimes a patient may openly and unabashedly
voice his wish for an inseparable relationship, for instance in such direct requests as
'Take me home with you,' or 'Let me go with you on your vacation.'" Id. at 852.
Or, taking another example, "In another therapy hour the therapist informed him
that he would be unable to keep their appointment. . . . T]he patient expressed
first fear that others might harm him during the therapist's absence, and then
anger at the therapist's 'untrustworthiness and stupidity'; then he switched to avowing
friendly feelings and esteem for the therapist, in addition to concern that he might
harm the doctor." Ibid.
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tute an important therapeutic step in the identification and separation process.
Like the courts, the psychiatrists must depend upon the specific
facts of the therapeutic situation. Professional doctrine becomes his
principal guide in discovering the patient's interest.40 The psychiatrist may rest with a therapeutic act which is countenanced by
the psychiatric profession. He need not pursue a course about which
there is unanimity, so long as the minority viewpoint is legitimately
recognized. 4 1
Nevertheless, in the psychotherapies, where decisions are numerous, minute, and critical,42 and where "standard procedures"
may be significantly, if covertly, eschewed so that the very concept
of. a community of practice is shaken,43 there must be more specific
guidelines for the doctor. For example, the psychiatrist must not
" See note 21 supra and accompanying text; see also PRossER, ToRis § 32, at
166-67 (3d ed. 1964).
4xSee Landau v. Verner (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23,
1961, p. 5, col. 1. The justice advised that courts should be chary of finding a
physician negligent merely because his treatment was unsuccessful or contrary to
what even a large majority of medical opinion would recommend. Ibid. See McCoid,
supra note 21, at 565. "Even where there is an established mode of treatment,
the physician may be permitted to innovate somewhat if he can establish that in
his best judgment this was for the benefit of the patient and where the established
modes have proved unsuccessful." Id. at 583. See also PRossER, op. cit. supra mote 40,
§ 32 at 166; Note, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 159 (1959).
The issue of whether the treatment given in the Hammer case was justifiable
innovation or proscribed experiment was not explicitly placed before the court, possibly to avoid the effect upon the jury of an admission of non-defensive beatings. The
tactic of denying that the course of conduct was undertaken as treatment appears
to have been adopted without quenching all of the brush fires. Thus, defendant's
alleged exclusion of the plaintiff's nurse from his consultation room might be
causally linked to the intentional application of the beatings. Furthermore, "Mrs.
Hammer also testified to conversations with the defendant wherein he stated that the
assaults complained of were part of the treatment." 7 App. Div. 2d at 218, 181 N.Y.S.2d
at 807.
"1See Fisch, Resistance to Change in the Psychiatric Community, 13 ARcHrvEs
GENERAL

PsYCHIATRY

359 (1965).

"Conversations are continually being steered by

the therapist not only in obvious ways, such as questions, but often by such subtle
clues as variations in attention, manifestations of tension such as changes in
breathing, tonal emphases, and even the display of books which indicate-the therapist's
areas of interest." Id. at 360. See also Burnham, supra note 8, at 352. Compare Landau
v. Werner (Q.B. March 7, 1961) in The Times (London), March 8, 1961, p. 5, col. 3:
"His Lordship thought that this lady might have read into small and innocent
gestures a meaning which they did not in fact possess as a result, perhaps, of the transference."

"8See Fisch, supra note 42. "That conventional clinicians depart from 'proper'
technique is most usually revealed in small 'trusted' groups, and as asides, rarely
in an open formal meeting. Even so, such asides still allow for the realization that

orthodoxy is not all that popular or slavishly followed and younger therapists in particular may soon realize the illusory nature of 'standard practice.'"

Id. at 361.
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orient his therapy towards eliciting behavior which will place the
patient in legal jeopardy. 44 This is not simply to say that the psychiatrist himself may not violate the criminal law in his practice.
It means also that, should the patient have drug addiction symptoms,4 5 the psychiatrist should not orient his therapy towards maintaining the use of narcotics as a condoned means of defense.40 Likewise, if the psychiatrist indulges in fornication with his patient,
it is not simply that the psychiatrist is not privileged to break the
criminal law, but that whatever his right to take his own fate in
his hands, he is not legally protected in encouraging his patient
to do so. 47
Although the rules of the medical ethics may offer some threshold
direction in the search for the terms of the trust, the motives of the
negligent psychiatrist need not constitute a breach of ethics for
liability to exist. In Landau v. Werner the court absolved Dr.
Werner of any professional misconduct even though it held him
"See Rosenfeld v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 635, 35 North. Co. R. 206 (C.P.
Northampton County Ct. 1959). In Rosenfeld, plaintiff became defendant's patient
after suffering migraine headaches, nervousness, and general weakness. When plaintiff
complained of severe pains a month later, defendant provided plaintiff with a prescription for demerol, a synthetic narcotic drug. Upon plaintiff's return from the
pharmacy, defendant instructed him in the use of, and provided him with a syringe
for injection of the drug. After some counseling psychiatric treatment ceased, but
the prescriptions for demerol were continued. Plaintiff was eventually diagnosed
by the Pennsylvania Department of Health as an addict. The addiction, it was alleged, began under defendant's care. The court held it error to enter a nonsuit since
one purpose of the Anti-Narcotics act was to limit prescriptions for drug addicts.
Id. at 643, 646, 35 North. Co. R. at 212, 214-15. While the case is initially concerned
with measuring the psychiatrist's liability under the criminal statute, the facts include
and suggest limits where, as there, the patient is led to a path of behavior which subjects
him to the sanctions of the criminal law.
'Rosenfeld v. Coleman, supra note 44.
46See Menninger, A Psychiatric View of the Police, The Police Chief, Dec. 1956,
p. 41. "We psychiatrists have not made it sufficiently clear that attempting to understand an individual whom we treat is not necessarily to condone all the behavior of
such an individual or even to expect inevitable penalties for such behavior to be
waived merely because he is in treatment. Not all my colleagues agree with me about
this. But I think we psychiatrists have sometimes put ourselves in a bad light by
giving the impression that if a man is taking treatment, he should be permitted continued offensiveness without penalty. I am willing to try to help him with his temptations; but not with his crime. I am willing to try to help a man who is tempted to
commit murder or arson, but I am not willing to treat a man-as an outpatientwho can't resist doing so. I grant that homosexual seductions, etc. are less serious
than arson or murder, but the principle is the same." Id. at 44.
" Kleptomania may be a more universal example because sexual mores in transition
have created a sexual law with mixed adherence. See Sachnoff, Book Review, 13
ARcHIvEs GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 478, 479 (1965).
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liable for
objective one.

709

The standard of the law of negligence is an

The psychiatrist's interest and the countertransference
Aside from the variety of conscious interests which he may pursue, the psychiatrist may have some duty to control his own emotional needs, conscious as well as unconscious. 49 To be sure, he may
pursue interests of his own: surely his financial interest in being
compensated, his professional interest in achieving a successful treatment, and his own emotional welfare are not to be completely
denied. Undoubtedly, he must maintain his emotional stability if
only because without it his capacity to empathize and participate in
the therapy by infusing it with his own energy might be lost. However, the interest must be followed only to the extent that it does
not conflict with, but rather tends to serve, the patient's emotional
well-being. If the psychiatrist hurts himself emotionally, he might
imperil the patient's stability.
On the other hand, if allowances were not made for the possible
psychological involvement of the psychiatrist, perhaps only an emotionally flat analyst with no emotional needs of his own would be
legally protected against a malpractice action. The law does not
appear to require that a psychiatrist who seeks to defend against a
malpractice action have been successfully analyzed. 0 His every
action need not be drive reduced and free of neurotic motive, nor
need it be uniformly recognized or accepted as drive reduced by the
psychiatric community. If, indeed, it were required of psychiatrists
that their emotional understanding be complete in the view of the
psychiatric community, there might not be enough psychiatrists
available for the treatment of the mentally ill. Even the psychiatric
"Whether the scope of the implied contract or representation to employ the
profession's standards of skill and care extends to include its standards of comportment and deportment may be an open question. Nevertheless, Landau stands for the
proposition that ethical professional conduct is not a defense to an action for malpractice. The necessity of ethical conduct recognizes an interest in privacy-something of decency and modesty-rather than a purely medical interest. However, in
psychotherapy where, as the Queen's Bench witness in Landau stated, there "could be
no separation between social and professional conduct," fixing the limits of proper
conduct becomes difficult indeed.
49 See Greenson, The Classic PsychoanalyticalApproach in 2 AMEUCAN HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 1399, 1409, 1413 (Arieti ed. 1959); Fisch, supra note 42, at 360-61.
"0A failure to have undergone analysis may be the case among psychiatric residents or interns.
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resident-a learner who may yet lack full understanding of his own
motives-must be utilized to provide therapy. 51 Psychiatry remains
a scarce resource.
On the other hand, some measure of understanding of and control over the countertransference ("a transference reaction of the
therapist to his patient" 52 ) is prerequisite to a defense of an action
in malpractice.5 3 However, the extent of insight into and control
over one's own motives and over the countertransference need not
be complete to be legally protected. The standard of practice of the
medical profession must be the guide to the case by case solution
of this problem.
The failure to exercise such control in a given case, however,
may be difficult to prove because of the limited external verifiability
of a person's motives, so many of which may be unconscious. An
example from the psychiatric treatment of suicidal patients will
suffice. A psychiatrist recently pointed out"' that decisions once
made in the security of a locked ward are now made on the outside,
thus creating anxiety among psychiatrists.5 5 This anxiety may be
J. PSYCHIATRY 542
51 See Ungerleider, That Most Difficult Year, 122 AMERICAN
(1965).
As far as interns are concerned, the case law does not convincingly demonstrate that
they are chargeable either with the standard of care of a student or, on the other
hand, with that of a licensed professional. See Note, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1946).
In th6 closest treatment of the situation, the court held for the defendant, an unlicensed dental intern, since there was no expert testimony that his practice was not
in accord with the standard of the profession. Haliburton v. General Hosp. Soc'y
of Connecticut, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946). But cf. Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall,
52 Ariz. 322, 80 P.2d 952 (1938); Christensen v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy
& Surgery, 248 Iowa 810, 82 N.W.2d 741 (1957); Carey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180
N.W. 889 (1921); Nickley v. Eisenberg, 206 Wis. 265, 239 N.W. 426 (1931).
2 Greenson, supra note 49, at 1413. See text at note 9 supra.
"Countertransference can be roughly defined as the converse of transference: the
repetition of previously acquired attitudes toward the patient, such attitudes being
irrational in the given situation." Cohen, Countertransference & Anxiety, in AN
OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

539 (1955). "When in the patient-analyst relationship,

anxiety is aroused in the analyst with the effect that communication between the two
is interfered with by some alteration in the analyst's behavior (verbal or otherwise),
then countertransference is present." .d. at 547. (Emphasis omitted.) Such a definition thus includes "all situations where the analyst was unable to be useful to the
because of difficulties with his own responses." Id. at 546.
patient
53
Landau v. Werner (C.A. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1961,
p. 5, col. 1.
"Address by Milton Rosenbaum, M.D., George Washington University Symposium on Suicide, October 14, 1965.
5 Compare Ungerleider, supra note 51, at 543.
For a more generalized treatment of liability in cases of suicide, see Perr, Liability
of Hospital and Psychiatrist in Suicide, 122 AMERICAN J. PSYCHIATRY 631 (1965). See
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transmitted to the patient so that the patient utilizes the suicidal
defense. The physician may thus be compelled to ask himself in a
given case whether his concern about the possibility of suicide
derives from the patient's needs, or from his own desire to be rid
of the patient. In a similar vein the psychiatrist might decide to hospitalize the patient as a way of getting rid of him. Sensing this, the
patient might turn to suicide. Here the doctor's own hostility
toward his patient may determine the patient's action. A suicide attempt can thus be precipitated by the psychiatrist's covert attempt
to be rid of the patient by sending him to a remote institution.
Understanding the legal import of these situations requires us
to make a distinction between psychoanalytic interpretation and the
breach of duty. It may be difficult to prove, for example, that sending a patient to a remote hospital amounts to a breach of duty. This
is not only because, unlike many who bring actions for wrongful
commitment, the patient is admittedly in need of psychiatric treatment. Furthermore, proof of a hostile unconscious motive on the
psychiatrist's part does not necessarily amount to a breach of duty.
Nevertheless, psychoanalytic interpretation has not yet been clearly
excluded from the scope of permissible expert testimony, though its
comprehension and acceptance by the jury cannot be guaranteed.
The question in each case should be whether the doctor has taken
undue advantage of the relationship for the pursuit of personal
gain; whether he has demonstrated a control of his own motives which
falls below the standard of the relevant psychiatric community, not
alone whether his treatment was an expression of his unconscious
hostility toward the patient. In deciding whether the psychiatrist
should be held liable for the suicides in the examples given, the
court would thus proceed on a two-step course. It would first decide whether the psychiatrist's degree of control of his own anxiety
or of his hostile feelings toward the patient fall below the level of
the relevant psychiatric community. It would then address itself to
problems of causation.
Proof of injury and proximate cause
Even where there has been some act of negligence by the psychiatrist, perhaps most significantly where he has breached his duty
also Hirsh v. State, 8 N.Y.2d 125, 168 N.E.2d 372, 202 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1960); Collins
v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 898, 258 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965).
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to the patient, the psychiatrist will not be held responsible for a
subsequent injury which is not the proximate cause of his breach. 0
In-short, the injury must be within the risk exposed by the breach,
and the person who is injured must be among the group protected
by the duty. Sometimes, however, patients who have begun psychothefapy, after having established a pattern of neurotic symptoms,
experience psychotic episodes while in treatment. It must be understood that such incidents may be unavoidable in the course of
therapeutic probing. However, what is peculiar in this situation
is that a suit instituted after such an incident may fix liability upon
the downside of a curve before its future path upward has had a
chance to emerge. The difficulty of proving injury in such a case
is, in part, due to insufficient knowledge of the course of the illness.
Thus, the tendency in some instances to attribute failure of improvement to a breach of duty on the part of the psychiatrist may
57
be a dangerous one.

6OEisele v. Malone, 2 App. Div. 2d 550, 157 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1957). Plaintiff alleged
negligence in the psychiatrist's continued use of shock therapy after symptoms of
spinal fracture appeared. The claim was made, inter alia, that the hospital was
negligent in failing to provide adequate X-ray facilities, and it was alleged that such
an examination was essential since it would have revealed the fracture and avoided
further injury. It was held that the verdict was invulnerable on this issue but that
the proof did not sustain the jury's conclusion that the absence of X-ray facilities
was, as it had to be, "directly related to and causative of plaintiff's condition." There
was no proof that, as the jury clearly believed, the doctor would have ordered
X-rays for plaintiff if such facilities had been available.
57 See Hammer v. Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d at 217, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (1959) (dissent),
modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). In the dissenting
opinion in the Appellate Division (with which the Court of Appeals agreed), Judge
McNally observed: "It is conceded that at the conclusion of defendant's treatment
between 1948 and 1955, involving expenditures of over $55,000, the condition of the
patient plaintiff had not improved. The lack of improvement despite the time lapse
establishes regression rather than stabilization of her condition." Ibid. Implicit
in this statement is the attitude that the injury was the regression itself.
But see Landau v. Werner (CA. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23,
1961, p. 5, col. 1. Lord Justice Sellers stated the question as whether Dr. Werner was
negligent, and if so, whether he caused a "further breakdown" in the health of Miss
Landau. This statement nullifies any question raised elsewhere in the opinion as to
the liability for return to her former condition. The question is a complicated one.
Is the psychiatrist liable only for the declines which bring the patient below the pretherapy level of his condition? There may be a point at which a gain realized in
the therapy has taken residence in the patient's personality and exists there aside
from a level of substantial dependence upon the psychiatrist. The difference is between a tenancy at will and a freehold held by the psychiatrist in the patient's
personality or particular defense mechanism. In between are a range of levels of
dependence whose identification as "substantial" must be the product of case by case
evaluation. Surely the psychiatrist cannot escape the consequences of malpractice
which cause a decline from ego development (dependent upon identification) to
its pre-therapy level. On the other hand, the gains which depend upon close thera.
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Only under rare circumstances does a psychiatrist give and may
therefore be held to an assurance of cure. What he engages to do
ordinarily is to pursue a cure by the methods of his profession. This
has been recognized by courts dealing with psychiatric treatment, 8
but there has been a concomitant tendency to consider sympathetically arguments based upon the disparity between lengthy and
costly treatment and failure of improvement. At some point, perhaps, there may be a duty upon a psychiatrist whose continued application has borne no visible fruit to abandon the case or to seek
consultation.5 9 However, only in one case, and there where the
patient had "fallen in love" with the doctor, was termination of
treatment considered the duty of the psychiatrist.6 0 To the extent
peutic support may not have been won to substantial freedom from the psychiatrist
so that their loss is understandable as having been wrested from the patient. So
likewise are those "technical corrections" which are experiential declines from
over-extended positions in the development of the personality during therapy. Thus
might a depressed patient become psychotic for two hours in the process of assimilating new levels of independence and ego strength. In such cases as in cases
of somewhat longer psychotic breaks which occur when emotionally laden areas are
therapeutically explored, the psychiatrist ought not to be held to answer in damages.
In this connection it has been suggested that the level of pre-existing condition
and the possibilities for cure determine the base line for the assessment of damages
and that both involve questions for expert determination. See Bellandi v. Park
Sanitarium Ass'n, 214 Cal. 472, 480-81, 6 P.2d 508, 512 (1931).
GsJohnston v. Rodis, 251 F.2d 917 (D. C. Cir. 1958). "Doubtless a physician's statement that he would cure a disease could seldom if ever be regarded as a warranty.
But that is not this case. The statement attributed to the defendant, that shock treatments are 'perfectly safe,' contains less of prediction and more of present fact. We
think this statement, if the defendant made it and did not qualify it in any way,
might properly be found to be a warranty." Id. at 918. Accord, Howe v. New York,
33 Misc. 2d 147, 153, 226 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (by implication); Hammer
v. Rosen, supra note 57; Landau v. Werner, supra note 57 (by implication).
10 In Landau v. Werner the Court of Appeal enunciated a duty to abandon the
therapy in terms that reach broadly through the concept of duty to encompass a
duty of consultation. At the moment when the patient had "fallen in love" with the
psychiatrist, the court demanded Dr. Werner's withdrawal: "It seemed now that
the most prudent thing for Dr. Werner to have done was to refer Miss Landau back
to her own doctor and advise that the treatment was not completed and should be
resumed with someone else." (C.A. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London), Nov. 23,
1961, p. 5, col. 1.
oLandau v. Werner, supra note 59. A holding which appears on its face to be
contrary to Landau is Gasperini v. Manginelli, 196 Misc. 547, 92 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup.
Ct. 1949). In that case it was held that allegations of a defendant psychiatrist's
failure to consult another psychiatrist before commencing treatment did not state a
cause of action for malpractice. "Defendant was himself a psychiatrist who had been
called in by the family physician. It is understandable that he did not see the need
for a consulting phychiatrist." Id. at 550, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 578. The decision is limited
to the naked requirement of employing a consulting psychiatrist at the outset of
therapy and would probably not govern a state of facts where long continued therapy
had borne no apparent results. Uncertainty of result, of condition, or of completed
treatment may raise a duty on the part of a psychiatrist to consult.
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that recognition of such a duty motivates the tendency to give mere
failure of improvement the weight of injury, it ought to be made
explicit in the cases. To the extent that sensitivity to the disparity
between fee and result is the underlying factor, the tendency is to be
criticized. Proof of maintenance of condition where decline is a real
possibility presents a probable line of defense. To sustain a cause
of action for malpractice there must be proof that improvement, of
which there was a substantial likelihood, was prevented by the
psychiatrist's breach of duty.
-On the other hand, there need be no proof of the effect of a
tortious act on the course of treatment itself where there is proof of
independent injury from which pain and suffering flow as natural
consequences. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals held in Hammer v. Rosen that since "damages recoverable in malpractice are for
personal injuries, including the pain and suffering which flow from
the tortious act," proof of bruises will sustain a jury's findings that
acts of assault have caused plaintiff pain and suffering.,'
The role of the courts
The price of recognizing a cause of action for psychiatric malpractice is some judicial ordering of psychiatric behavior. At times
this can be quite problematic. In the view of the Court of Appeal
in Landau v. Werner, for example, the course which Dr. Werner
should have taken upon discovering that his patient had fallen
in love with him was to abandon the therapy. It is settled, however,
that the evocation of feelings such as those which Miss Landau experienced is not the signal for termination of the relationship.
On the contrary, such intensity of feeling is not only the mark of
some therapeutic success, but the prelude to insight on the part of
the patient. Such a resurrection of the repressed feelings of childhood allows the intellectual and emotional examination of feelings
not previously understood or dealt with. Through such re-examination the emotional learning of psychotherapy occurs. 2 Uncertain
of the effects of this process, 63 the court could not accept Dr.
6
02

7 N.Y.2d at 378, 165 N.E.2d at 758, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 67-68.
See Witenberg, Rioch, & Mazer, The Interpersonal& Cultural Approaches, in 2

AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

1417, 1426 (Arieti ed. 1959).

63,"She was ashamed and baffled at the way her affection had developed towards
a married man with two children. It was something that was perhaps inherent in the
system of treatment of transference." (C.A. Nov. 22, 1961) in The Times (London),
Nov. 23, 1961, p. 5, col. I.
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Werner's judgment that a relapse would probably accompany Miss
Landau's removal from his influence. It could not visualize the
social visits as his sincere attempt to find a therapeutic solution to
the problem of gratifying the patient's dependency need while at
the same time fostering independence. Why then was the termination of the relationship, rather than continued but less frequent
therapy, the path to have been followed?
The answer may have something to do with the fact that the
medical testimony before the court was taken as a uniform condemnation of social visits. Such uniformity may have been only an
accident of proof. That testimony for Dr. Werner's technique may
have been difficult to obtain is not only witness to the reluctance of
physicians generally to testify in malpractice cases, 64 but is a special
problem in the proof of the standard of practice in the relevant
psychiatric community.
Although not explicitly in response to these facts, courts have
not required expert testimony to establish that behavior "whose
very nature bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice" is
wrongful. In Hammer v. Rosen the Court of Appeals held that it
was error not to submit the issue of malpractice to the jury even
though there had been no expert testimony to the fact. The testimony of three witnesses that the defendant had beaten his patient
on a number of occasions made out a prima facie case. 65 This rule
has been elsewhere recognized in cases of psychiatric malpractice
where severe assaults have resulted in physical injury to the patient.6
Following it in cases of emotional injury might create more of a
problem. In either case, expert testimony can rebut the prima facie
case. To the extent that the court's answer in Landau v. Werner
reflects uneasiness in handling psychiatric doctrine, repeated dealings with psychiatric malpractice situations may dispel some uncertainty. Routinization of psychiatric procedure may eliminate
See Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HLv. L. Rxv. 333 (1963).

"See note 37 supra.
"Bellandi v. Park Sanitarium Assn, 214 Cal. 472, 6 P.2d 508 (1931) (death by
choking employed to restrain patient); Burton v. Leftwich, 123 So.2d 766 (La.
Ct. App. 1960) (assault and battery upon child patient employed to keep her still
while removing sutures); Note, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 333, 346 n.81 (1963). The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is sometimes applied in this context. See Sawyer v. Jewish Chronic
Disease Hosp., 234 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Hammer v. Rosen should not be read to condemn all physical restraint, whether by
straps or hand, when it is necessary to control the patient. See generally Annot.,
89 A.L.R.2d 983 (1963).
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the rest. Nevertheless, the extent of sometimes covert innovation
within the psychiatric community suggests that procedures such as
67
those of Drs. Rosen and Werner may persist.
Conclusion
Through unfamiliarity with mental illness and psychiatry and
because of problems in the nature and development of psychiatry
itself, the few cases in which courts have considered psychiatric
malpractice provide only limited and sometimes confusing guidelines to the medical profession. Continued litigation may provide
more clarity. Some aspects of malpractice as they have emerged in
the decided cases between psychiatrist and patient have been considered. It has been suggested that because the concept of trust plays
so large a part in psychotherapy-and as a tool of legal analysis admits the concept of preferential interest-it should be explored as
a guide to deciding cases of malpractice concerning the therapeutic
relationship. The medical profession itself can provide standards
for judging the patient's interest in a given case. Countertransference might then be regulated, and the limits of psychiatric activity delineated by requiring the psychiatrist continually to prefer
the interest of his patient to his own.
67 Compare Fisch, supra note 42, at 362.

